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SELECTION OF STATE COURT JUDGES
by
Theodore McMillian
ACH individual's view of the problems or benefits associated with
either election or merit selection depends upon how that individual
strikes the balance between the seemingly conflicting goals of public
accountability and judicial independence. At the outset, it should be noted
that merit selection per se is hardly a debatable topic. Everyone can readily
agree that judges should be selected on the basis of merit. The real problem,
and the source of much legal and political controversy, is which method to
use to select the best qualified individuals. A secondary question, which will
not be addressed here, is what qualifications should be considered in making
that selection. Thus, to speak about merit selection as a particular method
of judicial selection is misleading; merit selection is the desired end result.
Proponents of the partisan election of judges assert that popular election
insures public accountability. Critics of partisan elections, however, view
popular election as fraught with problems that necessarily compromise judi-
cial integrity and independence.
Historically, partisan elections led to the domination of the process of ju-
dicial selection by political machines. Although today the influence of polit-
ical machines in many locales has been considerably reduced, single party
domination of local politics is not uncommon. A recent series of articles in
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch focused upon the problems surrounding the par-
tisan election of judges in Illinois. Illinois, Texas, Arkansas, and West Vir-
ginia are the only states in which judges are selected exclusively by partisan
election. The Post-Dispatch articles pointed out that in heavily Democratic
Cook County, in metropolitan Chicago, only twenty-seven of the 177 elected
judges are Republicans.' Certainly, those statistics would discourage even
the most qualified Republican candidate from running for judicial office.
The Post-Dispatch articles also pointed out that many qualified candi-
dates of both political parties were discouraged from running for judicial
office by the high cost of judicial campaigns. In 1984, one Illinois Supreme
Court justice spent $300,000 in his successful campaign for retention in of-
fice. His opponent, an appellate court judge with seventeen years experience,
spent $122,000.2
Many would-be judicial candidates were dissuaded from running by the
prospect of campaign fund-raising. In Illinois, judicial campaigns are almost
1. Gauen, Politics on the Bench (pt. 1), St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 26, 1986, at B6.
2. Id. at B1.
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exclusively financed by lawyer contributions. Although the judges inter-
viewed for the Post-Dispatch articles denied that contributions influenced
their decisionmaking, critics of partisan elections point out that contribu-
tions create at least the appearance of partiality.3
Critics of partisan elections also discount the role of the public in selecting
judges by popular election. Such critics note that the public is often poorly
informed about judicial candidates and their qualifications, and that judicial
campaigns are generally not informative. Moreover, judicial candidates are
constrained from taking stands on controversial issues or specific cases by
the Judicial Code of Conduct. Although local bar associations publish the
results of lawyers' polls about the qualifications of judicial candidates, these
polls receive little, if any, media attention.
Furthermore, in large metropolitan areas, the number of candidates run-
ning for judicial office can be staggering. In 1986 there were eighty-eight
judicial candidates in the primary election for Cook County alone.4 One law-
yer-legislator, who is also a leading critic of partisan elections for judges and
who has introduced legislation to adopt merit selection in Illinois, stated that
she did not know eighty percent of the names on the ballot. 5
It has been assumed that the election of judges would open the judiciary to
women and members of minority groups. One concern has been that merit
selection nominating commissions could emphasize professional qualifica-
tions and experience to camouflage what are essentially exclusionary or dis-
criminatory selection criteria or procedures. For example, one criterion
often cited is that an applicant have fifteen years of legal experience, includ-
ing wide experience in trial matters. Although length of legal experience is
undoubtedly a legitimate consideration, it sharply reduces the number of
eligible women and minority candidates. A recent study cited in the Na-
tional Law Journal, however, disputes the theory that partisan elections nec-
essarily increase minority representation on the bench. 6 According to the
study, the greatest number of women and minorities serving on the bench
have been appointed, not elected. 7
To remove partisan politics and other problems associated with the elec-
tion of judges, many states have adopted merit selection. In 1940 Missouri
became the first state to adopt merit selection, and the "Missouri Non-parti-
san Court Plan" has been used as a merit selection model by many other
states. The Missouri Plan applies to the selection of trial judges in the St.
Louis and Kansas City metropolitan areas and to the selection of all appel-
late judges, including Missouri Supreme Court Justices. Trial judges in the
rest of the state continue to be elected in partisan elections.
The Plan provides for judicial nominating commissions, which are com-
prised of a judge and an equal number of lawyers and lay persons. The
3. Gauen, Politics on the Bench (pt. 2), St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 27, 1986, at BI.
4. Gauen, supra note 1 at B .
5. Id. at B6.




Appellate Judicial Commission has seven members, with the Chief Justice of
the Missouri Supreme Court serving as the judicial member. The Circuit
Court Nominating Commissions have five members, with the chief judge of
the appellate district in which the circuit court is located serving as the judi-
cial member. The lawyer members of the nominating commissions are
elected on a non-partisan basis by local bar association members and serve
staggered six-year terms. The lay members are appointed by the governor to
staggered six-year terms.
When a judicial vacancy occurs, the appropriate judicial nominating com-
mission selects three persons and forwards their names to the governor, who
then selects one for the appointment. If the governor fails to appoint one of
the three nominees within sixty days, the nominating commission appoints
one of the three nominess. This last provision was added to the Missouri
Plan in the 1950s to avoid a situation in which the governor refuses to ap-
point any of the nominees.
After serving at least one year, the appointed judge faces a retention elec-
tion at the next general election. A simple majority is needed for retention.
Recently, there have been proposals to increase the percentage necessary for
retention to sixty percent. As with partisan elections, the public is often
poorly informed about the judges in the retention election. Missouri bar
polls receive little publicity. So far, all the judges who have been appointed
under the Missouri Plan have been retained.
In theory, the Missouri Plan balances the competing interests of public
accountability and judicial independence and, at the same time, fosters pub-
lic confidence in the judiciary by selecting the best qualified candidates on
the basis of merit and ability. The Plan also encourages well-qualified law-
yers to consider a judicial career by providing for independence and long
tenure.
Recently, however, the merit selection of judges in Missouri has received
much media attention and public criticism based upon allegations that judi-
cial politics have replaced partisan politics in the judicial selection process.
For example, in 1982 one Missouri Supreme Court justice was accused of
engineering the nomination of three judicial candidates whom he regarded as
compatible with the court. The state Commission on Retirement, Removal
and Discipline of Judges investigated the allegations and ultimately found no
probable cause that the justice had committed any wrongdoing.
These serious allegations of improper judicial influence upon the judicial
selection process prompted the state bar association and the Missouri Senate
to form committees to study and investigate the current operation of the
Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan. The State Senate Report8 found no ma-
jor structural flaws in the Missouri Plan. The Senate Report, however,
found "very evident" problems with the operation of the Missouri Plan due
to the "inability of the bench and bar to meet their considerable responsibili-
8. MISSOURI SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE NONPARTISAN COURT
PLAN (Jan. 24, 1986).
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ties under the plan." 9 The Senate Report further noted that "[m]embers of
the bar have come to accept widespread politicking for judicial appoint-
ments," with the result that the concept of "merit" selection has devolved
into a test of lobbying skills. The report stated that "[t]he role of the public
has been reduced significantly below that [originally] envisioned," and that
"the public's voice in retention elections is meaningless."'10
In order to reduce the influence of the bar and the bench and to increase
the role of the public, the Senate Report recommended that the judicial
member of the nominating commission serve in a nonvoting capacity and
that the number of lay members be increased by one. II In addition, the
Senate Report found that because the nominating commission procedures
were informal, they were subject to manipulation and to lobbying efforts.
The report, therefore, recommended that nominating commissions adopt
uniform interviewing and voting procedures. 12
The State Bar Association Report' 3 found that the Missouri Plan worked
effectively and had produced a high quality judiciary. Unlike the Senate
Report, the Bar Association Report rejected suggestions to remove the vot-
ing rights of the judicial member and to increase lay representation on the
nominating commissions. 14 The Bar Association Report agreed in substance,
however, with the Senate Report's recommendation that the nominating
commissions needed to formalize their interviewing and voting procedures.
The Bar Association Report recommended that the Missouri Supreme Court
promulgate a procedures manual, which would include standards for evalu-
ating candidates as well as uniform interviewing and voting procedures. 15
The lack of meaningful standards for evaluation of judicial candidates is
rather unsettling in view of the emphasis placed upon professional qualifica-
tions in merit selection. The primary objective of merit selection is, after all,
the selection of judges with superior professional and personal qualifications.
To preclude even the appearance of impropriety and lobbying for judicial
nominations, the Bar Association Report also proposed promulgation of
supreme court rules to define the scope of permissible judicial activities, to
require that all written communications received by one nominating com-
mission member be forwarded to the entire nominating commission, and to
require that any oral communication with nominating commission members
be reduced to writing. 16 In addition, the Bar Association Report specifically
recommended promulgation of a rule barring a nominating commission
member from initiating or receiving any communication from the governor
about any candidate for a vacancy before the nominating commission selects
9. Id. at i.
10. Id. at ii.
11. Id. at iii.
12. Id. at iv.
13. MISSOURI BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW AND EVALUATE
THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE MISSOURI BAR (Jan. 15, 1986).
14. Id. at 12-13.
15. Id. at 16-18, 20-21.
16. Id. at 19-20.
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the three nominees.1 7 This suggestion was proposed in response to another
problem of merit selection, the problem of pre-selection.
Perhaps the most serious flaw of the Missouri Plan is pre-selection. Pre-
selection strikes at the heart of the underlying premise of the Missouri Plan:
the selection of judges on the basis of professional qualifications, not political
affiliation. An illustration of pre-selection follows. Suppose there is a judi-
cial vacancy for which the governor has favorably mentioned one particular
individual. Subsequently, the nominating commission selects a panel of
three nominees that, by coincidence, includes the individual favored by the
governor. The governor then appoints that individual to the vacancy. Many
court-watchers in Missouri suspected such pre-selection was involved in
1985 when the governor appointed his thirty-three year-old chief of staff to
the state supreme court over two experienced appellate judges.
Has merit selection removed the judiciary from the "contamination of
partisan politics"? It is unlikely that it has. Has merit selection removed
judicial politics from the judicial selection process? Again, it is unlikely.
There is general agreement among commentators that the Missouri Non-
partisan Court Plan has not been completely successful in eliminating either
partisan or judicial politics from the judicial selection process. Rather, the
Plan has been successful only in altering, to a certain extent, the role played
and the degree of influence exerted by such politics. Merit selection appears
to have changed the way that politics influences judicial selection, but the
partisan and political features have merely been obscured, not eliminated.
Although it may be impossible to completely eliminate political influence in
the judicial selection process, it is imperative that efforts to reform the judi-
cial selection process continue in order to increase the process's "merit selec-
tion" component.
17. Id.
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